Consciousness is first of all an ''experience'' that determines the state of awareness. Husserl (1) defined the state of consciousness as an ''intentional'' state, which means that it corresponds to aiming at ''something'' and supposes ''a certain attention to life'' (2) . In this sense, consciousness is coextensive with ''mind'' (3). Self-awareness, or reflexive consciousness or ontogenic consciousness (4) , is the understanding that the subject has of his own states of consciousness. The subject can thus separate himself from his perception and realize that he is in the process of perceiving. The reflexive consciousness allows the subject to be the object of his awareness. At the same time, because he knows that he is thinking, he is the object of his awareness. The aphorism of Descartes (''I think, therefore I am'') shows that man can realize that he is thinking and also deduce from this the reality of his existence.
Self-consciousness is multifaceted (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) . It is awareness of the body, that is of its morphological characteristics as well as its position and mobilization in space. Self-awareness is also the consciousness of perceptions. Self-awareness is the consciousness of one's own history, of one's autobiography (3) . It is thus inseparable from memory, thanks to which the identity of each human being is constructed. Self-consciousness is the consciousness of one's own projects. Finally, self-consciousness is a moral consciousness that allows the human being to make judgements about his thoughts and actions. In the extreme sense, the impairment of self-consciousness implies that the subject is no longer conscious of existing.
Throughout life, self-consciousness assembles a stream of perceptions, thoughts, recollections, projects and actions which express the permanence and coherence of the ego and thus of the human person. If consciousness can be the object of scientific study (3, 5) , searching for impairment of self-consciousness in a patient requires considering which aspects of self-awareness are altered or preserved. Finally, assumptions need to be made about the mechanisms governing the alteration of self-consciousness as a function of lesion sites and models of the functioning of higher nervous activities (5, 9).
Alzheimer's disease (AD) raises the question of impairment of self-consciousness in the clearest and probably most exemplary manner. AD involves disorders of the memory as well as of other cognitive functions and leads to a progressive overall deterioration of the intellect and the personality (10) (11) (12) . Studies of self-consciousness during AD concern essentially the anosognosia of cognitive disorders.
The purpose of this work was to propose a neuropsychological study of self-consciousness (SC) in a population of patients with AD in an attempt to answer the following questions: Are the different aspects of self-consciousness affected homogeneously or heterogeneously? What are the relations between alteration of SC and the natural history of the disease? What assumptions can be made about the mechanisms of alteration of SC during AD?
Patients and methods
Fourteen questions were prepared to obtain information from the patient about certain aspects of SC ( (Nos 13, 14) . These were simple questions intended to study SC as ecologically as possible, i.e. in a manner as close as possible to the everyday life of subjects.
In a preliminary study, the criteria for rating replies were carefully determined by three of us (a neurologist and two neuropsychologists) as relevant (two points), incorrect (no points) or partly correct (one point). The score obtained for each of these aspects of consciousness was divided by the number of questions corresponding to each aspect. Thus, the total maximum score for the seven aspects was 14 points.
To contrast the total integrity and alteration of SC, the partly correct and incorrect answers were grouped together as poor answers with respect to ''relevant'' ones as good answers. The assistance of the family was always needed to check the accuracy of the answers with reference to the autobiography and the affective state.
In a first part of the study, test-retest reliability (Spearman correlation) and interobserver reliability (Kendall correlation) for the questionnaire were analysed (10) in 18 patients (9 men and 9 women) with a mild (n=4; Mini Mental State >20) or moderate (n=11; 10<Mini Mental State<21) form of AD according to NINCDS-ADRDA criteria (13) and DSM-IV-R (14) .
The second part of the study concerned 45 patients with a mild [Mini Mental State (15) (MMS >20] or moderate (10<MMS<21) form of AD. The examiners ensured that the answers were understood by the patients, and only those whose verbal comprehension (assessed by the MMS' threestage command) was equal to or above 2 were included in the study. A frontal score was determined for each patient based on the performance of a group of tests exploring frontal functions, which were assembled by Slachevsky et al. (16) under the designation ''Frontal assessment short test''.
The number of poor answers was calculated for each aspect of SC. Multiple pairwise comparisons were performed by a chi-square test with Bonferroni correction. Comparisons of scores of patients with an MMS of 10 to 20 with those whose MMS was greater than 20 were done using the Student's t-test.
The profile of the Self-Consciousness Questionnaire was analysed by determining possible correlations between each item and the MMSE.
Results
The 18 patients in the preliminary study had a mean age of 76. Neither age nor educational level (Table 2 ) differed significantly in mild and moderate forms of the disease. The length of disease was greater in the group of patients with the lowest MMS, although the difference did not reach the threshold of statistical significance. Conversely, the frontal score was significantly more altered in the group of patients with the lowest MMS. Likewise, the total score for the SC questionnaire was significantly lower in the group of patients with the lowest MMS.
No significant correlation was found (Table 3 ) between the score for the SC evaluation questionnaire and educational level or age. There was a slight correlation between the SC score and the length of disease, although this correlation did not reach the threshold of statistical significance. Conversely, there was a significant correlation between the SC and the severity of the cognitive deficiency evaluated by the MMS, whereas the correlation with frontal score was very close to the significance threshold. There was a significant correlation between the MMS and frontal scores (r=0.65, P<0.001).
However, the different aspects of SC were not disturbed with the same degree of intensity. For the 45 subjects, 68.90% of poor answers (incorrect plus partly correct answers) were obtained for anosognosia, 46.67% for moral judgements, 40% for prospective memory, and only 6.67% for representation of the body. The distribution of good and poor answers is indicated in Table 4 . Pairwise comparisons of the number of poor answers with each of the aspects of SC (with Bonferroni correction) showed that awareness of the disease was more often altered than any other aspect of SC. Moreover, poor answers to moral judgements were fewer than poor answers to questions exploring anosognosia, and more numerous than poor answers to questions exploring all other aspects of SC except prospective memory. Thus, it would appear that the most disturbed aspects of SC were consciousness of cognitive disorders (metacognition), moral judgements and prospective memory, whereas the two least disturbed aspects were consciousness of identity and consciousness of representation of the body.
Consciousness of identity was explored by items 1, 5, 6 and 7. All patients replied to item 1. Among the other three items, only item 7 (mother's first name) was significantly correlated with the MMS score 
Discussion
AD clearly induces an alteration of self-consciousness, but not a total abolition, so that it cannot be said that patients are unaware of existing or more generally that reflexive consciousness no longer exists. Moreover, alteration of self-consciousness is heterogeneous. Anosognosia is the self-awareness alteration most commonly observed and the only aspect of SC that has already been frequently studied during AD (18) . Anosognosia is related to the degree of cognitive deficiency for Migliorelli et al. (19) , and Starkstein et al. (20) , and to the severity of cognitive deficiency and involvement of frontal functions for Lopez et al. (21) . For Ott et al. (22) , the severity of anosognosia is related to the deficiency of frontal and visuospatial functions. Reed et al. (23) observed that anosognosia is associated with a deficiency in the perfusion of the dorsolateral portion of the right frontal lobe, and these authors noted in psychometric terms a relation between the existence of anosognosia and mistakes in recognition memory, whereas no relation was found with other memory tests or the severity of dementia. For Dalla Barba et al. (24) , anosognosia of memory deficiency is required for subjects to experience intrusions, whereas frontal dysfunction is not a necessary condition for the onset of anosognosia. Michon et al. (25) and Nargeot et al. (26) noted a relation between the severity of anosognosia and signs of frontal dysfunction, but not with the severity of cognitive deficiency. In our population, a significant correlation was found between anosognosia score and the severity of dementia, but also with the severity of frontal disorders. In our series of patients, it proved impossible to distinguish between the role played by severity of cognitive deficiency and that of frontal dysfunction. In fact, there was a high correlation between MMS and frontal scores (r=0.658; P<0.001). Moreover, each of the three items exploring anosognosia (items 2, 3, 4) appeared to be significantly related to the overall cognitive deficit evaluated by MMS. Conversely, items exploring the consciousness of identity gave dissociated results. All patients in our series with moderate or severe forms of AD were able to give their surname and first name. Moreover, items 5 and 6 (job, spouse's or partner's first name) were not correlated with the MMS score; only item 7 (mother's first name) was linked to the MMS score, probably because it was one of the least consolidated aspects of autobiographical memory.
As the affective state appears to be independent of dementia severity, it is necessary to search for depressive manifestations in both mild and moderate dementia. All patients replied to item 10, and the score for item 9 was not correlated with the MMS score: in fact, very few patients had body representation disorders, so that this aspect appeared quite sound. Neither prospective memory (though often deficient) nor capacities for introspection seemed to be related to the MMS score. However, it is particularly noteworthy that moral judgements were significantly correlated with the MMS score. Thus the Self-Consciousness Questionnaire is a multidimensional form of measurement. The questionnaire, like the MMS, provides an overall assessment of cognitive deficiency, but it is also a clinicianassisted scale whose items are not all related to the MMS. Thus, it allows a better understanding, from one patient to another, of the heterogeneity of SC alteration in AD.
Consciousness requires the synthesis of information from countless neuronal networks located in brain areas involved in the processing of sensorial data, memory, and the management of emotional life (5). Thus, consciousness implies an assembly of information arranged sequentially, thereby allowing a choice of the actions to be undertaken. Consciousness is thus the implementation of a ''supervisory'' system (5) that considerable clinical evidence has related to the frontal lobe (27, 28) . SC offers the capacity to control the supervisory system, thereby representing the summit of the cognition hierarchy.
In the monkey, the prefrontal multimodal associative areas receive information from all unimodal associative areas and from all other multimodal associative areas (29) . These observations have enabled models for the organization of connections in the human frontal lobe to be established (30, 31) . In AD, neuronal alterations involve a large number of cortical areas of the allocortex and the isocortex as well as the connections between them (32). The information normally arrives in the associative frontal cortex. It is possible to distinguish between a multimodal associative frontal cortex and a supramodal one representing the most phylogenically recent portions located in the rostral-most part of the frontal lobe (9) . The disconnection of the former (particularly of the dorsolateral frontal cortex) could account for disturbances in the sequential organization of information (9) . The disconnection of the latter could account for difficulties in ensuring synthesis, i.e. the processing of information activated simultaneously. This probably constitutes the difficulty of concentrating ''attention on life'' (2), which could be the common denominator for SC alteration during AD. The alteration of SC could represent the central deficiency in AD. It is still necessary to evaluate the role of this impairment in disorders of the activities of everyday life, behavioural disorders and associated distress as well as the human and ethical problems raised by this disease.
